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TRUTH-SPEAKING; THE FACT VERSUS THE
IMPRESSION.
BY CORA LENORE WILLIAMS.
NOW that the god ship Trutli, after having ridden many a philo-
sophical gale, seems about to slip her moorings and disappear
forever in the treacherous waters of Pragmatism, her sister ship
Mathematics should to the rescue ; she too may come to need the
life line, her topsails, geometrical though they were, having already
gone by the board.
With the passing of the Puritanic influence from our religion
has come a renaissance of Greek ideals in matters of veracity. For
the cultured Greek there were two forms of lying, the honorable
and the base ; the difference lay in the motive ; a lie told in a good
cause was not a falsehood.
Of this moral substratum of the Greeks, there are frequent out-
croppings in the field of modern literature. Stevenson says that to
sjjcak the truth is not to state the true facts, but to convey a true
impression ; Maeterlinck, that as soon as one is no longer among
equal consciences, every truth, to produce the effect of truth, re-
quires focusing ; and as still further evidence of this same general
conformation, we have the statement from James that our duty to
agree with reality is grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete ex-
pediences.
Along with the growing scientific habit of facts in all lines of
research, there is an increasing tendency to regard facts lightly in
matters of personal relation. As man comes to realize the inexor-
ableness of the natural laws to which he is subjected, he would
assert his independence by setting his own spiritual standards.
The application of mathematical principles to the problems of
ethics should bring about some moral determinations of practical
value. The general purport of much present writing on the subject
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of moral truth is to place such truth with the empirical sciences, and
there is no science to-day but that acknowledges its dependence
upon mathematics. From physical geography to political economy,
graphical analysis has been found to have great interpretive value
and the methods of the calculus are working their way into all lines
of research. The ethical chart has been too long in the hands of
the impressionists ; it stands in need of some strong mathematical
lines to clear up the general blur and bring out definite principles
of action.
Let us represent the import of a certain incident which vou
wish to tell me by the length and direction of the line AB.
B
Fig. I.
This segment stands for the truth in the matter as it appears
to you and which you expect by a statement of the facts to convey
to me. These facts may be regarded as component forces (for con-
venience reduced to two) AC and AD applied at A.
D
Fig. 2.
The resultant AB is then determined as the diagonal of their
parallelogram ACBD. (See Fig. 3.)
Now if these forces, AC and AD, were entirely under your
control there would be no question as to the effect. It were then
as simple a matter as it is generally supposed to be to speak the
truth. But through some ignorance or prejudice on my part, a
deflection or change in magnitude may take place in one or both
components, so that I get quite another impression AB' from the
one AB that you intended I should receive. (See Fig. 4.)
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You have spoken the facts but I have not heard the truth.
Or again there may be factors bearing on the case, of so subtle
and ehisive a nature, that while you feel intuitively their importance,
you know yourself unable through lack of expression to give them
their due weight. In either case if you have an eye single to the
truth of the im])ression you wish to make, you will be impelled to
D
Fig. 3-
alter the forces at your command to avoid the probable error on
the part of the hearer. Then if you have made the proper correction,
we shall have the same resultant AB from a different set of com-
ponents ACi, AD^. (See Fig. 5.)
The moral issue in the problem is evidently one with the mathemat-
ical, and for the pragmatist has its solution, as far as our parallelo-
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gram represents it, in any set of components that will give the
correct resultant.
But at this juncture I hear the mathematician ask of his co-
worker, the moralist, "What of the forces of reaction, are they not
operative in your world as in mine?" "Certainly," that other re-
plies, "should the speaker fail in his computations for the making
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of the correct impression, his veracity will stand in danger of
being questioned. A lie that has its origin in a bad judgment carries
with it the same consequences as the lie that comes from a bad
purpose. However great one's desire to hit the bull's e^ye of truth,
to the extent that he falls short of the mark, is he handicapped in
his future efiforts to make it, for his errors are sooner or later
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attributed to unworthy motives and corrections in turn made on his
statements. But any power may be misdirected ; ignorance has
merely its attendant penalty in this as in other functions of life."
The mathematician here interposes, "Let us grant that the desired
goal has been gained with all good intent, even then I fear we shall
find deleterious results coming from the forces of reaction. Inas-
Fig. 6.
much as the angle of deflection for any particular component must
change for each recipient, if the resultant in question is to remain
a constant, there will in time come about a disintegration of the
standard component (the fact as it was originally known to the
speaker) through its various substitutes striking it on their return
at all angles.
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In that the deflections have been made in the cause of truth,
there is the jii^reater danger that the truth should be lost. There are
no conii)unctions of conscience to keep it in sight as in the falsehood
that knows itself false."
The reality for any one is his experience as it stands in his own
mind. If the images of that experience in the minds of others when
reflected back do not merge into and strengthen the original image,
they will blur its outlines, if they do not destroy it altogether. A
disassociation of personality with all its attendant evils is likely to
follow^ as a consequence. A weak character must needs anchor
itself firmly to the facts, if it would attain to an individuality of
its own.
That the making of a correct impression has come to take pre-
cedence of the speaking of the fact is due largely to our considera-
tion for others. Ours is a religion of altruism whose charity covers
a multitude of sins including that greatest of all sins, ignorance.
The Greeks lied to protect the weak ; we lie so as to foster the weak-
ness itself. How frequently we say, "I could not tell him the truth
for he would not understand." At times it may be necessary to
sacrifice one's truth, as it is at times necessary to sacrifice one's
health, for others ; we should, however, not do so in the name of
truth but of the other moral obligation that for the time being we
rightly or wrongly place above the truth.
The problem of truth-speaking is so closely correlated with that
of truth-hearing that the two should be considered as one. The
injunction to speak the truth should be preceded by the one to hear
the truth. How often do we find ourselves unable to give utterance
to the fact through the consciousness of an ear that will not under-
stand. In the strained moments of a close friendship or of family
relations, a falsehood is frequently invoked by an unsympathetic atti-
tude. As Thoreau says, it takes two to tell the truth, one to speak
it, and one to hear it. A child knowing that he will suflfer mis-
interpretation, if not injustice, for the reason that his motives can
not be understood, in his impotence hurls a lie into the very face of
the facts themselves. Nor are such obliquities peculiar to children.
Most of us recall humiliating incidents of the kind in our grown-up
experience. Mr. George Gissing in his Ryccroft Papers gives one
so apropos of the point in hand that I quote it in its entirety.
"At an inn in the north I once heard three men talking at their
breakfast on the question of diet. They agreed that most people ate
too much meat, and one of them went so far as to declare that, for
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his part, he preferred vegetables and fruit. 'Why,' he said, 'will
you believe me that I sometimes make a breakfast of apples?' This
announcement was received in silence ; evidently the two listeners
didn't quite know what to think of it. Thereupon the speaker, in
rather a blustering tone cried out, 'Yes, I can make a good break-
fast on two or three pounds of apples.'
"Wasn't it amusing? And wasn't it characteristic? This hon-
est Briton had gone too far in frankness. 'Tis all very well to
like fruit and vegetables up to a certain point ; but to breakfast on
apples ! His companions' silence proved that they were a little
ashamed of him ; his confession savored of poverty or meanness
;
to right himself in their opinion, nothing better occurred to the man
than to protest that he ate apples, yes, but not merely one or two
he ate them largely, by the pound."
We should prepare ourselves to receive the truth as we pre-
pare ourselves to speak the truth. To tell another the truth as it
is known to you, is to offer him the highest recognition of equality
with yourself.- To hear the truth as it is told you is to establish
that equality in the fullest sense.
